Based on the work of Carlos Santiso and Sven Holdar concerning governance and the EU’s relations with the Global South, it appears that the European Commission (EC) is somewhat confident in its aid strategies, though it lacks a clear understanding of what should be prioritised in terms of external cooperation. This ambiguity was echoed by the head of the EU delegation to Egypt, Klaus Ebermann, who elaborated on various topics of cooperation, referencing the Union’s historical developments and progress over the past two decades. A review of the EC’s website reinforces this impression, as it functions more as a marketing tool for the delegation’s mission in the region than as a source of clarity.
Questions often arise when engaging with readings, web sources, and Ebermann’s lecture—some have been answered clearly, but others remain unresolved. For instance, considering the collapse of the EC in 1999 and the introduction of a new system, has the Commission, after nine years, reached a clear understanding of what constitutes good governance? From Ebermann’s lecture, it became apparent that the EC embraces structural adjustment strategies as a necessary component of cooperation with developing countries. This approach is consistent with that of other aid organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. However, while Ebermann asserted that the EC does not impose conditionality in its foreign support, this claim seems somewhat misleading. Observations and follow-ups on the Commission’s activities suggest otherwise, though it must be acknowledged that the EC employs conditionality to a much lesser extent than other organisations.
Another issue concerns the criteria used by the Commission to select countries for support. For example, why does Egypt receive aid from the EC despite being a major recipient of USAID and not a low-income country compared to nations in Sub-Saharan Africa? It is evident that the EC is primarily focused on its ‘Neighbourhood Policy’, a recurring theme in various sources and EU summits since the Barcelona Declaration. This focus aligns with the Union’s priorities of security and economic cooperation, but it also underscores that humanitarian aid is not a primary concern for the EU, contrary to its publicised rhetoric.
A further point of contention arises from the recent developments in the EC that seemingly contradict the notion of ‘unity’ in European Union decision-making. The integration of the Mediterranean project initiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy into EC strategies remains unclear. Who will oversee this project, and how will it align with existing frameworks? Ebermann’s remarks highlighted disagreements among member states, as many aspects of the initiative are not new but merely reiterate the Barcelona Declaration. It appears to be an attempt at reviving this agreement, which has been deprioritised over the years. However, the project is still in the process of finalisation, with its ultimate purpose—whether economic, security, or political—yet to be determined.
Returning to the matter of Egypt’s aid and the Industrial Modernisation Centre (IMC), a significant concern arises regarding the EC’s role. The IMC, heavily publicised as being supported by the EC, has faced widespread reports of corruption at all levels. How has the EC addressed these issues? Surprisingly, Ebermann revealed that the EC ceased cooperation with the IMC upon his appointment in 2004. The IMC is now financed by the Egyptian government and other donors. This revelation is striking, particularly as the IMC continues to advertise itself as affiliated with the EC, using its logos and publications—a practice that, remarkably, does not appear to trouble Ebermann.
In conclusion, while the EC appears generous in its support for developing countries, it maintains minimal conditionality, adhering to the tradition of structural adjustment—a strategy whose efficacy remains questionable. At the same time, the EC is highly selective in its aid, driven by its ‘Neighbourhood Policy’. The ‘unity’ of EU decision-making continues to struggle towards consolidation, hindered by unilateral actions from individual member states. Finally, the concept of ‘good governance’ remains as unclear in the EC’s policies today as it was prior to the Commission’s collapse in 1999, which may explain its limited reliance on conditionality.
This article is originally published in English by Southpush.