Western newspapers described the recent Russo-Georgian war as the worst conflict since the Afghan war of the 1980s—a statement that strongly reflects a Western sense of shock at Russia’s reaction to Georgian provocations. This comes after nearly two decades of apparent hibernation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such descriptions also underscore the West’s general reluctance to rush to the aid of their Georgian protégé—their long arm in the Russian hinterland.
We all understand that this recent war was driven by political and strategic motives, as the Russian bear sent a global message warning that it may have been hibernating, but only ‘by choice’. The world, it implied, should avoid encroaching on its natural sphere of influence, even during its dormant periods. The West failed to grasp this message, leaving the young Georgian state trapped in a crisis without tangible assistance—save for empty diplomatic rhetoric.
However, it is essential to examine the economic aspect of this sudden Russian resurgence, as it sheds light on how global powers operate. The economic element of any war can either be a cause or a consequence; in this case, it is intriguingly both, making it a subject worthy of study. Even among us Arabs—Russia’s allies of the past—a belief had taken root that the old bear was in its death throes, much like the Western perception of the Ottoman Empire as the ‘sick man of Europe’ in the early 20th century. Yet, it is now clear that the old bear has not aged as much as we thought. Rather, it was undergoing a ‘biological’ pause, regathering its strength and carefully reorganising its priorities—a meticulous makeover to re-enter the global arena.
Economically, this unexpected resurgence as a ‘cause’ can be seen in the notable success of former President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s administration in achieving two primary goals. First, it capitalised on Russia’s transition to capitalism—the ideological antithesis of its Soviet predecessor—while avoiding the pitfalls of Western exploitation, which had been glaringly evident during Boris Yeltsin’s era of humiliating political and economic concessions marred by corruption.
Second, it restructured Russia’s domestic economy to build a new state on a smaller geographical scale than the Soviet Union but with ambitions to reclaim its former international influence. Putin’s strategy involved adopting capitalism as Russia’s economic framework, trimming the claws of his opponents, and exiling the oligarchs—Yeltsin’s so-called ‘fat cats’—to the far corners of the Western world.
Today, the world is fully aware of Russia’s new economic character: a capitalist system underpinned by skyrocketing oil revenues, a significant industrial heritage, a formidable military export sector (some of which is tailored to allies shunned by the USA), and a centralised political decision-making structure reminiscent of its Soviet past, albeit much smarter. These factors provide the confidence for Russia, after this patient transformation, to engage in its first battles and emerge victorious.
This is an economic ‘state of readiness’ that enables Russia to address lingering economic disputes with former Soviet states—issues that have long been a thorn in the bear’s side. The time has come to handle these challenges decisively, and recent developments suggest that military options are no longer off the table. It is humiliating, after all, for oil to travel through long pipelines across neighbouring states—avoiding Russian territory altogether—before reaching Europe via Georgia. Such arrangements were designed to bypass Russia and impose economic control, a situation Russia reluctantly accepted during Yeltsin’s tenure. Georgia, emboldened by Western support, even threatened Russian interests through a war of words that severely impacted Russia’s natural gas exports—one of its most vital new resources fuelling its return to the global market.
As a direct economic outcome of this war, the West now appears to have no choice but to negotiate with the returning Russian bear as an economic partner in the global balance of power. This will likely lead to a resolution that satisfies Russia on several trade-related issues, including securing gas and oil supplies to Europe. Furthermore, this situation poses an awkward dilemma for Western powers, already reeling from the failure of the latest round of WTO negotiations. Russia could potentially play a pivotal role in pressuring its opponents or, at the very least, leveraging its cooperation in the global game of interests to its advantage.
This article is originally published in English by Southpush.