The past year has been one of the most significant in Turkey’s modern political history, marking a turning point in its complex relationship with both regional and global powers. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Tripoli last week was yet another chapter in the diplomatic drama that Turkey is crafting with remarkable skill.

Speaking at the Libyan-Turkish Trade and Investment Forum in Tripoli, Erdoğan announced: ‘The removal of visa requirements between our two countries will strengthen ties between businesspeople.’ Accompanied by around 200 Turkish officials and business leaders, he also revealed plans to increase flights between Libya and Turkey, reinstating a transport route from İzmir to Tripoli that had been discontinued during the sanctions era. Furthermore, he announced a joint Turkish-Libyan agricultural bank with an initial capital of $1 billion.

Erdoğan expressed hope that annual trade between the two nations would grow to $10 billion within five years. The talks also covered key political issues, including bilateral relations, the Palestinian cause, and broader global concerns such as regional peace and UN reform—an apparent nod to Libya’s leader Muammar Gaddafi, whose ‘historic’ speech at the UN General Assembly less than two months earlier had dominated international discussions for weeks.

Turkey’s visit to Libya is just one stop in a diplomatic tour with a clear economic agenda, led by Erdoğan. Prior to this, he made a highly significant visit to Iran—despite Turkey still being, at least ‘legally’, Israel’s most important regional ally. While in Tehran, Erdoğan held discussions with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki.

As with previous visits, Erdoğan was accompanied by a high-level economic delegation, including ministers, MPs, and business leaders. He also took the opportunity to reassure Iran—Turkey’s long-standing Persian rival with ambitions of regional dominance—describing the country as a ‘friend’ and accusing Western nations of hypocrisy in their handling of Iran’s nuclear file. He dismissed Western allegations against Iran as ‘mere rhetoric exposing the duplicity of those who voice them’ and warned that any military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities would be ‘nothing short of madness’.

These visits are part of a broader diplomatic offensive spanning the Islamic and Arab world, including Pakistan—visited just one day before Iran—and many other countries. Turkey is effectively replicating its successful economic partnership with Egypt, which has bolstered its regional political influence. This approach has also yielded strong results in Syria, once a bitter enemy.

Erdoğan has seized every possible opportunity to win over Arab and Muslim public opinion, particularly after his fiery outburst at the Davos Economic Forum. In a moment broadcast live to millions, he publicly confronted Israeli President Shimon Peres, the UN Secretary-General, the Arab League Secretary-General, and the forum’s organiser, before storming out in protest against Israel’s war on Gaza. His display of anger transformed him into a populist leader, winning the admiration of people long accustomed to nothing but empty condemnations from their own governments.

This shift is neither accidental nor driven by a sudden surge of nationalism among the Turkish leadership. Rather, it is a calculated strategic move—one that places Turkey’s economy at the heart of a vast geopolitical landscape. It taps into both political and public aspirations for renewed Turkish influence after decades of marginalisation, while also appealing to populations yearning for a powerful voice to champion their cause.

By maintaining negotiations for EU membership, Turkey appears to be pursuing a dual strategy. On one hand, it is capitalising on European hesitation, using the delay to reap significant economic benefits as the ‘Ottomans’ return to their historical strategic depth in the Islamic and Arab worlds. On the other, Turkey’s growing assertiveness is likely fuelling European fears of its resurgence as an ideological challenge to the West—one they endured for nearly 500 years. The result? A scenario in which Europe may find itself accelerating Turkey’s EU accession process to avoid the very outcome it fears most.

This article is originally published by AlBorsa in Arabic and later AI-translated by South Push.