When a Reuters correspondent asked Yemen’s Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, last week about the level of aid the country needed to rescue its struggling economy—battling a sharp population increase and declining oil revenues—his response was telling: ‘I am not an economist, but I believe we are talking about around four billion dollars a year.’
Such a vague, unsubstantiated answer is precisely the kind of rhetoric that pushes a country towards actual collapse. The fact that he is the foreign minister, not the finance minister, does not justify making statements of this nature. But this response reflects the desperate political and military predicament facing Yemen’s government, which is now in urgent need of financial support—preferably in the form of economic aid—to maintain some semblance of sovereignty and avoid outright humiliation.
Before delving into strategic details and the conditions imposed by donor states and organisations, it is crucial to take a quick look at Yemen’s economic situation—one plagued by chronic issues long before the recent crises involving the Houthis and al-Qaida.
Unemployment exceeds 40%, with official reports putting the figure at 35%, up from 16.7% the previous year. Educational levels among workers are alarmingly low—62.3% have not completed primary education. Meanwhile, political instability has deterred investment, further crippling productivity.
Half of Yemen’s population lives below the poverty line, with 47% of its more than 20 million people surviving on less than two dollars a day, and 18% on less than a dollar. Among them, 7.9% suffer from extreme food insecurity, based on international standards.
Corruption is another major obstacle, hindering any serious attempt at political or economic reform. Reports indicate that corruption drains around 60% of the country’s public budget, with high-ranking officials implicated in misappropriating state funds.
Security instability, particularly the war in Saada—which escalated when Saudi Arabia became directly involved—poses further risks. Add to this the growing threat of al-Qaida and calls for secession from factions in the south, and the picture becomes even more precarious.
In this context, Yemen fits the definition of a ‘failed state’, as described by sociologists: a country turned into a regional battleground, with Saudi Arabia as a direct participant, while Iran and the USA play unofficial roles. All of this is happening under a president who has ruled with the tools of a lone dictator for three decades.
One of the last resorts for regimes like this is to cry for help from the wealthy West—always eager to expand its influence over fragile states, regardless of their history or civilisation. The pragmatism of global politics no longer acknowledges the value of heritage.
Tragically, Yemen has all the necessary conditions to fall into the West’s orbit of ‘conditional aid’—a game in which every dollar received, whether deposited into the state’s treasury or into the pockets of corrupt officials (a distinction donors seem unconcerned with), comes at the cost of yet another concession.
The West’s list of demands—decades in the making and expanding by the year—is as long as Yemen’s borders. It may begin with economic ‘advice’ in the form of hollow buzzwords like ‘structural reform’, a linguistic sleight of hand perfected by the World Bank. But it rarely ends there. More often, it extends into direct interference in the most intimate aspects of society, even challenging interpretations of the Quran itself.
This is an even deeper social collapse than before. Yemen has already embarked on it, like many other developing nations, by extending its hand and embracing foreign aid—not just accepting it but eagerly awaiting it. The London conference on Yemen, scheduled for 28 January, is seen by the government as a final lifeline after losing control over almost everything else.
This article is originally published by AlBorsa in Arabic and later AI-translated by South Push.